/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010 Nicira Networks.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Nicira, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "coverage.h"
#include "dynamic-string.h"
+#include "entropy.h"
#include "leak-checker.h"
#include "ofpbuf.h"
#include "openflow/openflow.h"
/* SSL context created by ssl_init(). */
static SSL_CTX *ctx;
-/* Maps from stream target (e.g. "127.0.0.1:1234") to SSL_SESSION *. The
- * sessions are those from the last SSL connection to the given target.
- * OpenSSL caches server-side sessions internally, so this cache is only used
- * for client connections.
- *
- * The stream_ssl module owns a reference to each of the sessions in this
- * table, so they must be freed with SSL_SESSION_free() when they are no
- * longer needed. */
-static struct shash client_sessions = SHASH_INITIALIZER(&client_sessions);
-
-/* Maximum number of client sessions to cache. Ordinarily I'd expect that one
- * session would be sufficient but this should cover it. */
-#define MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_CACHE 16
-
struct ssl_config_file {
bool read; /* Whether the file was successfully read. */
char *file_name; /* Configured file name, if any. */
static bool ssl_wants_io(int ssl_error);
static void ssl_close(struct stream *);
static void ssl_clear_txbuf(struct ssl_stream *);
+static void interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function);
static int interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error,
int *want);
static DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_export OVS_UNUSED, int keylength);
static void log_ca_cert(const char *file_name, X509 *cert);
static void stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name,
- bool bootstrap);
+ bool bootstrap, bool force);
static void ssl_protocol_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *, size_t, SSL *, void *sslv_);
+static bool update_ssl_config(struct ssl_config_file *, const char *file_name);
static short int
want_to_poll_events(int want)
static int
new_ssl_stream(const char *name, int fd, enum session_type type,
- enum ssl_state state, const struct sockaddr_in *remote,
- struct stream **streamp)
+ enum ssl_state state, const struct sockaddr_in *remote,
+ struct stream **streamp)
{
struct sockaddr_in local;
socklen_t local_len = sizeof local;
VLOG_ERR("CA certificate must be configured to use SSL");
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
}
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ if (!retval && !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
VLOG_ERR("Private key does not match certificate public key: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
retval = ENOPROTOOPT;
}
static int
-ssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct stream **streamp)
+ssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct stream **streamp, uint8_t dscp)
{
struct sockaddr_in sin;
int error, fd;
return error;
}
- error = inet_open_active(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin, &fd);
+ error = inet_open_active(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin, &fd,
+ dscp);
if (fd >= 0) {
int state = error ? STATE_TCP_CONNECTING : STATE_SSL_CONNECTING;
return new_ssl_stream(name, fd, CLIENT, state, &sin, streamp);
fd = open(ca_cert.file_name, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0444);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno == EEXIST) {
- VLOG_INFO("reading CA cert %s created by another process",
- ca_cert.file_name);
- stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(ca_cert.file_name, true);
+ VLOG_INFO_RL(&rl, "reading CA cert %s created by another process",
+ ca_cert.file_name);
+ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(ca_cert.file_name, true, true);
return EPROTO;
} else {
VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: creating %s failed: %s",
if (!cert) {
out_of_memory();
}
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, X509_STORE_new());
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert.file_name, NULL) != 1) {
VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return EPROTO;
}
-static void
-ssl_delete_session(struct shash_node *node)
-{
- SSL_SESSION *session = node->data;
- SSL_SESSION_free(session);
- shash_delete(&client_sessions, node);
-}
-
-/* Find and free any previously cached session for 'stream''s target. */
-static void
-ssl_flush_session(struct stream *stream)
-{
- struct shash_node *node;
-
- node = shash_find(&client_sessions, stream_get_name(stream));
- if (node) {
- ssl_delete_session(node);
- }
-}
-
-/* Add 'stream''s session to the cache for its target, so that it will be
- * reused for future SSL connections to the same target. */
-static void
-ssl_cache_session(struct stream *stream)
-{
- struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream);
- SSL_SESSION *session;
-
- /* Statistics. */
- COVERAGE_INC(ssl_session);
- if (SSL_session_reused(sslv->ssl)) {
- COVERAGE_INC(ssl_session_reused);
- }
-
- /* Get session from stream. */
- session = SSL_get1_session(sslv->ssl);
- if (session) {
- SSL_SESSION *old_session;
-
- old_session = shash_replace(&client_sessions, stream_get_name(stream),
- session);
- if (old_session) {
- /* Free the session that we replaced. (We might actually have
- * session == old_session, but either way we have to free it to
- * avoid leaking a reference.) */
- SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
- } else if (shash_count(&client_sessions) > MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_CACHE) {
- for (;;) {
- struct shash_node *node = shash_random_node(&client_sessions);
- if (node->data != session) {
- ssl_delete_session(node);
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* There is no new session. This doesn't really make sense because
- * this function is only called upon successful connection and there
- * should always be a new session in that case. But I don't trust
- * OpenSSL so I'd rather handle this case anyway. */
- ssl_flush_session(stream);
- }
-}
-
static int
ssl_connect(struct stream *stream)
{
MSG_PEEK);
}
- /* Grab SSL session information from the cache. */
- if (sslv->type == CLIENT) {
- SSL_SESSION *session = shash_find_data(&client_sessions,
- stream_get_name(stream));
- if (session) {
- SSL_set_session(sslv->ssl, session);
- }
- }
-
retval = (sslv->type == CLIENT
? SSL_connect(sslv->ssl) : SSL_accept(sslv->ssl));
if (retval != 1) {
} else {
int unused;
- if (sslv->type == CLIENT) {
- /* Delete any cached session for this stream's target.
- * Otherwise a single error causes recurring errors that
- * don't resolve until the SSL client or server is
- * restarted. (It can take dozens of reused connections to
- * see this behavior, so this is difficult to test.) If we
- * delete the session on the first error, though, the error
- * only occurs once and then resolves itself. */
- ssl_flush_session(stream);
- }
-
interpret_ssl_error((sslv->type == CLIENT ? "SSL_connect"
: "SSL_accept"), retval, error, &unused);
shutdown(sslv->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
* certificate, but that's more trouble than it's worth. These
* connections will succeed the next time they retry, assuming that
* they have a certificate against the correct CA.) */
- VLOG_ERR("rejecting SSL connection during bootstrap race window");
+ VLOG_INFO("rejecting SSL connection during bootstrap race window");
return EPROTO;
} else {
- if (sslv->type == CLIENT) {
- ssl_cache_session(stream);
- }
return 0;
}
}
free(sslv);
}
+static void
+interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function)
+{
+ int queued_error = ERR_get_error();
+ if (queued_error != 0) {
+ VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s",
+ function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL));
+ } else {
+ VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error", function);
+ }
+}
+
static int
interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error,
int *want)
}
}
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL: {
- int queued_error = ERR_get_error();
- if (queued_error != 0) {
- VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s",
- function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL));
- } else {
- VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error",
- function);
- }
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ interpret_queued_ssl_error(function);
break;
- }
default:
VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: bad SSL error code %d", function, error);
}
}
-struct stream_class ssl_stream_class = {
+const struct stream_class ssl_stream_class = {
"ssl", /* name */
+ true, /* needs_probes */
ssl_open, /* open */
ssl_close, /* close */
ssl_connect, /* connect */
int fd;
};
-struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class;
+const struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class;
static struct pssl_pstream *
pssl_pstream_cast(struct pstream *pstream)
}
static int
-pssl_open(const char *name OVS_UNUSED, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp)
+pssl_open(const char *name OVS_UNUSED, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp,
+ uint8_t dscp)
{
struct pssl_pstream *pssl;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
return retval;
}
- fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin);
+ fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin, dscp);
if (fd < 0) {
return -fd;
}
int new_fd;
int error;
- new_fd = accept(pssl->fd, &sin, &sin_len);
+ new_fd = accept(pssl->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, &sin_len);
if (new_fd < 0) {
error = errno;
if (error != EAGAIN) {
sprintf(strchr(name, '\0'), ":%"PRIu16, ntohs(sin.sin_port));
}
return new_ssl_stream(name, new_fd, SERVER, STATE_SSL_CONNECTING, &sin,
- new_streamp);
+ new_streamp);
}
static void
poll_fd_wait(pssl->fd, POLLIN);
}
-struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class = {
+static int
+pssl_set_dscp(struct pstream *pstream, uint8_t dscp)
+{
+ struct pssl_pstream *pssl = pssl_pstream_cast(pstream);
+ return set_dscp(pssl->fd, dscp);
+}
+
+const struct pstream_class pssl_pstream_class = {
"pssl",
+ true,
pssl_open,
pssl_close,
pssl_accept,
pssl_wait,
+ pssl_set_dscp,
};
\f
/*
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
+ if (!RAND_status()) {
+ /* We occasionally see OpenSSL fail to seed its random number generator
+ * in heavily loaded hypervisors. I suspect the following scenario:
+ *
+ * 1. OpenSSL calls read() to get 32 bytes from /dev/urandom.
+ * 2. The kernel generates 10 bytes of randomness and copies it out.
+ * 3. A signal arrives (perhaps SIGALRM).
+ * 4. The kernel interrupts the system call to service the signal.
+ * 5. Userspace gets 10 bytes of entropy.
+ * 6. OpenSSL doesn't read again to get the final 22 bytes. Therefore
+ * OpenSSL doesn't have enough entropy to consider itself
+ * initialized.
+ *
+ * The only part I'm not entirely sure about is #6, because the OpenSSL
+ * code is so hard to read. */
+ uint8_t seed[32];
+ int retval;
+
+ VLOG_WARN("OpenSSL random seeding failed, reseeding ourselves");
+
+ retval = get_entropy(seed, sizeof seed);
+ if (retval) {
+ VLOG_ERR("failed to obtain entropy (%s)",
+ ovs_retval_to_string(retval));
+ return retval > 0 ? retval : ENOPROTOOPT;
+ }
+
+ RAND_seed(seed, sizeof seed);
+ }
+
/* New OpenSSL changed TLSv1_method() to return a "const" pointer, so the
* cast is needed to avoid a warning with those newer versions. */
- method = (SSL_METHOD *) TLSv1_method();
+ method = CONST_CAST(SSL_METHOD *, TLSv1_method());
if (method == NULL) {
VLOG_ERR("TLSv1_method: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return ENOPROTOOPT;
if (!dh->dh) {
dh->dh = dh->constructor();
if (!dh->dh) {
- ovs_fatal(ENOMEM, "out of memory constructing "
- "Diffie-Hellman parameters");
+ out_of_memory();
}
}
return dh->dh;
update_ssl_config(struct ssl_config_file *config, const char *file_name)
{
struct timespec mtime;
+ int error;
if (ssl_init() || !file_name) {
return false;
/* If the file name hasn't changed and neither has the file contents, stop
* here. */
- get_mtime(file_name, &mtime);
+ error = get_mtime(file_name, &mtime);
+ if (error && error != ENOENT) {
+ VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: stat failed (%s)", file_name, strerror(error));
+ }
if (config->file_name
&& !strcmp(config->file_name, file_name)
&& mtime.tv_sec == config->mtime.tv_sec
}
static void
-stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap)
+stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name,
+ bool bootstrap, bool force)
{
X509 **certs;
size_t n_certs;
struct stat s;
+ if (!update_ssl_config(&ca_cert, file_name) && !force) {
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!strcmp(file_name, "none")) {
verify_peer_cert = false;
VLOG_WARN("Peer certificate validation disabled "
for (i = 0; i < n_certs; i++) {
/* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of the relevant data. */
if (SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, certs[i]) != 1) {
- VLOG_ERR("failed to add client certificate %d from %s: %s",
+ VLOG_ERR("failed to add client certificate %zu from %s: %s",
i, file_name,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
} else {
/* Set up CAs for OpenSSL to trust in verifying the peer's
* certificate. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, X509_STORE_new());
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, file_name, NULL) != 1) {
VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
void
stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap)
{
- if (!update_ssl_config(&ca_cert, file_name)) {
- return;
- }
-
- stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(file_name, bootstrap);
+ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(file_name, bootstrap, false);
}
\f
/* SSL protocol logging. */